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Abstract 
The objective of this thesis is two-fold: first, to determine how parties get elected to the European 
Parliament (EP); second, how they vote, once in power. I compare two founding member states 
(France and the Netherlands) to two newer ones (Poland and Hungary). In order to investigate the 
degree of disconnection between public opinion and the votes of these countries’ delegates, I 
measure the former through the so-called Eurobarometer surveys. I count the bills voted on, broken 
down by political party for the time between May 2014 and March 2016. 
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Introduction 
Within the European Union (EU), the European Parliament (EP) is the only body that is directly 
elected since 1979. Elections take place in each of the member states separately, and the number 
of seats allotted is divided according to the size of their respective populations. I selected two 
founding member states in France and the Netherlands and two newer member states with Poland 
the Hungary accounting for size variation as well. The purpose of my thesis is twofold; first to 
determine how they get elected and then to assess how they vote in the EP. 
 The dependent variable in my study has to parts, the first is the European Parliamentary 
election results with the aim of finding out how parties get elected (see Appendix 1) and the second 
is voting of the political parties of the European Parliament and the goal is to understand what 
happens once they are elected to this body. The two elections I will be looking at as points of 
comparison are the 2009 and 2014; the two most recent ones to have taken place. I then also use 
the VoteWatch website to count on all bills in two specific issue areas which are the economy and 
foreign and security policy. The independent variable of my study is public opinion and I gauge it 
by using the Eurobarometer (EB) for four member states prior to the 2014 elections and after to 
determine if any changes are present and what the relationship is to the results. 
 The first section provides the methodology. Secondly, I present the results from the two 
elections, as well as the Eurobarometer prior to and post the 2014 elections. In the third section, I 
examine the results of voting in the European Parliament for the four member states. Finally, I 
examine the results theoretically. I conclude with the implications of the study.  
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Methodology 
I begin this chapter by presenting my variables as well as their indicators. I will provide an 
overview of the four countries I selected for my study and how they allow me to account for 
possible variations in multiple ways. 
 
DV 
I put forth two parts to my dependent variable (DV). These are aimed at providing insight into the 
variation or stability between the two most recent elections and what occurs once the 
representatives take their seats in the EP. The first part of my DV is the European parliamentary 
election results for June 2009 and May 2014 (the two most recent ones). The indicators are the 
seat share in the EP after the 2009 and 2014 elections, respectively. I gather this data from the 
European Parliament’s (European Parliament 2017) website (i.e. what individually members got 
elected from which party in my four countries). 
 The second part of my DV (see Appendix 2) is how European parliamentarians vote on 
particular bills (on the economy and on foreign policy) from the 2014 election until March 2016. 
The former is one that is commonly understood as part of the European portfolio, while the latter 
falls traditionally under the jurisdiction of the member statesi. The timeline begins after the 2014 
EP election and ends at the point in which I began gathering data which was March 2016. In order 
to gather these votes for each bill, I used the only database that contains this type of information, 
VoteWatch.eu (2016). With this website I can access each bill for a specific date range and a 
particular issue area. I chose to focus on two issue areas. 
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IV 
The independent variable is about public opinion; it seeks to determine if public opinion leads to 
the election of political parties or alternatively that the election of political parties lead public 
opinion. The indicator is public opinion in the EU; as a measurement I use the surveys by the so-
called Eurobarometer (EB). The EB is a survey conducted by public opinion firms on behalf of 
the European Commission; its main product is the so-called Standard EB, which takes place twice 
a year by engaging in a thousand representative phone interviews for each member state. The 
purpose is to determine how the public in the four member states felt prior to the 2014 EP election 
and then how they felt after. I use the EB surveys from November 2013 and 2014ii. I selected the 
following questions (European Commission 2016): 
- Trust in the European Union? 
- A common foreign policy of the 28 member states of the EU? 
- A common defence and security policy among EU member states?iii 
- What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, 
worse or the same, when it comes to the economic situation of the European Union? 
- Trust or tend to trust the European Parliament? 
 
Country Selection 
I compare France, Poland, the Netherlands and Hungary in order to capture any possible variation 
along three lines: (a) between a large founding member (France) and a big country of the most 
recent 2004 enlargement wave (Poland); (b) between a small founding state (the Netherlands) and 
an equally-sized addition in 2004 (Hungary); as well as (c) between the original member states 
(France and the Netherlands) versus new ones (Poland and Hungary). iv Within the European 
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Parliament, France has the second-largest EP seat share (after Germany) with 74. By contrast, 
Poland holds 51 seats. The Netherlands have 26 seats, whereas Hungary’s EP share is 21 
(European Parliament 2017). 
 
The Path to Getting Elected 
This section is about the first part of my dependent variable. According to Hix et al. (2007, 134-
35), the role national parties have in the voting of the political parties and their decisions remains 
strong in the face of their placement in the European Parliament. 
 
France 
The Front National (FN) has a long history within France. Founded in 1972 and led from its 
inception until 2011 by Jean-Marie LePen put forth a nationalistic French vision. The FN made its 
first breakthrough in the late 1980s by increasing its vote share at both the national and EP levels. 
In the following decades, the divisiveness of its leader made it difficult to attain success. That 
changed in 2011 when Marie LePen differentiated herself from her father and took over the party’s 
leadership. (Ray 2017) 
 The Front National wants to take France out of the European Union. Much of its time is 
spent explaining the need and desire for the country to become more independent and while it does 
not often explicitly state its desire to remove itself from the EU it is classifiable as Eurosceptic 
(Front National 2016), although not as extreme as some of its European counterparts. 
 Les Républicains, on the other end of the spectrum, is a party that fits within the country’s 
mainstream politics. It is important to note that they are a renamed version of the Union for a 
Popular Movement but their ideals remained the same. The newly named party’s platform makes 
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direct mention of their desire for an open and democratic Europe as well as a European citizenry 
(Les Républicains 2016). It is without question that they fit within the middle part of the political 
spectrum in France and they are open advocates for the European Union. At the national level they 
had immense success in the 2012 having won the official opposition and they were the majority 
party in 2007 (Election Resources on the Internet 2017b). Their success at both levels makes the 
FN’s success that much more unique. 
 At the national level the FN managed to collect a total of only two of the total of 577 seats 
while Les Républicains garnered 194 (Election Resources on the Internet 2017b). In 2009, the 
party with the most seats was Les Républicains at 29 and the least was the Front National with 
only three, but that changed with the 2014 election (see Appendix 3). The Front National became 
the strongest party with 23 seats while the previous majority holder, Les Républicains, saw 
themselves relegated to second with 19 members elected (European Parliament 2017). 
 
Poland 
The party that has recently emerged is Law and Justice. It has not progressed through its history 
without a share of controversy. While its elected officials have expressed negative opinions about 
minorities, the party has still attained success at the national level. Law and Justice won a national 
election in 2005 and it has been able to translate this success to the EP level. (The Democratic 
Society 2017c) 
 Law and Justice has emerged as the one of the leading parties in the European Parliament 
after trailing the governing party by ten seats after their inaugural election. Not only did it gain at 
the EP level but it also won the national government in 2015 (Smith 2015). While its views are not 
extreme in any sense, it is Eurosceptic to a similar degree as its French counterpart, the Front 
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National. Its view is that control over economic affairs and immigration should remain out of the 
hands of the EU, but it is by no means completely against the European Union or its institutions 
(Smith 2015). 
 Civic Platform is the first party in the country’s history to hold back to back terms in power; 
however, it began as the opposition party to Law and Justice. While not a deep history, it does 
have a recent reputation of holding power in the country and evidently at the European level.v It is 
centred on economic strength, social justice and many liberal ideas that are not present in the 
opposition parties. Civic Platform believes less in nationalistic values and more in the need to be 
part of a thriving Europe; its party leader has been touted for the Presidency of the European 
Commission. It has also shown interest in joining the Eurozone, but has not yet set a schedule to 
do so (The Democratic Society 2017b). 
 Congress of the New Right and KORWiN hold nearly exactly the same set of values, 
especially their views of the European Union. The Congress of the New Right was founded by 
Janusz Korwin-Mikke as Eurosceptics (PECOB 2016). After apparently fathering two children out 
of wedlock, he was removed as a member of the Congress of the New Right (Radio Poland 2015). 
In the face of this event he founded a new party. The Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic - 
Freedom and Hope (KORWiN) was his new platform to promote the same Eurosceptic ideas 
(Nardelli 2015). 
 The situation in Poland is slightly different. There was not one party that grew its seat share 
the way FN did but there was a shift in the same direction. Prior to the 2014 EP election Civic 
Platform had 25 of the 51 Polish seats while Law and Justice had 15 and both the Congress of the 
New Right and KORWiN had none. This changed in 2014 when Civic Platform and Law and Justice 
now both held 19 seats, while the latter had two each (see Appendix 4). 
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The Netherlands 
Led at the time by Geert Wilders, the Party for Freedom took an anti-EU position and obtained 
enough seats nationally to have influence as the balance of power (The Democratic Society 2017d). 
The role of its longtime leader shaped the party's position. Wilders advocates for the Netherlands 
leaving the EU as well as the return of the country’s old currency (Hale et al. 2017). 
 The Party for Freedom is the polar opposite of its mainstream counterpart CDA. Led by 
Geert Wilders, it managed to obtain increased popularity in the March 2017 Dutch election. While 
an important proclamation of the party is that the Netherlands must remove themselves from the 
European Union, it also holds an anti-Islamic position (Evans 2017). 
 Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) came from the formation of three of the most 
dominant parties in Dutch history. Their pasts were closely tied together having worked hand in 
hand on many occasions and the CDA quickly emerged as a party able to appease many sides. 
While the party is built on different factions, one of the key tenants is its commitment to the 
European Union. Its performance at the national level has been anything but consistent however it 
still holds part of the popular vote and with the most seats at the EP level it has proven to be able 
to obtain a high enough level of support to make it relevant (The Democratic Society 2017a). 
 Christian Union-Reformed Political Party offers the Dutch population a more moderate 
option than the Party for Freedom. While extreme in its own right, its focus has not been attacking 
the European Union, it has chosen more value based elements. The party leadership, in the face of 
a court ruling against its refusal to allow women as members, emphasized that its belief is based 
solely on the teachings of the bible (BBC News 2005). 
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 Its 26 seats are shared by eight different political parties from different parts of the 
spectrum (European Parliament 2017). The first aspect that stands out is the even distribution of 
seats, the most held by one party is five while the least is two (see Appendix 5). The seats won by 
each party and how they are divided help to tell a story just as was the case for the prior two 
countries. Christian Democratic Appeal has managed to maintain a five seat share in both of the 
past elections while the highly Eurosceptic Party for Freedom held four for two consecutive 
elections. It is the less Eurosceptic and more mainstream Christian Union - Reformed Political 




The current national governing party, Fidesz, gained success shortly after its founding in 1988. 
The party leader, Viktor Orbán, brought Fidesz to power in 1997 which it held until 2002. In the 
wake of the financial crisis, it returned to power in 2008. (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2014) 
 Fidesz has been able to maintain also in the EP electionsvi (Election Resources on the 
Internet 2017a). While mainstream nationally, the party considered Eurosceptic in the EP. Viktor 
Orbán, opposes the way the Union is currently designed and even doubts its ability to last if it does 
not change its ways (Mudde 2015). This rhetoric carries more doubt in the EU than the supporting 
Hungarian parties. 
 Jobbik: Movement for a Better Hungary is clearly Eurosceptic (Jobbik 2017). Its leader 
believes that the EU is a body for the rich countries to take advantage of the poorer ones. These 
words have also translated into actions; party President Gábor Vona, has staged multiple protests 
and has also made the symbolic gesture of burning the flag of the European Union (The Orange 
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Files 2016). It rejects the various EU treaties and suggests that Hungary could leave and join forces 
with a country such as Iceland (The Orange Files 2016). 
 The situation in Hungary is very similar to that of the Netherlands in terms of political 
stability at the EP level. The main difference is that the seat distribution is not as even and there 
are only four main parties represented with over half of its 21 seats going to Fidesz (European 
Parliament 2017). Three of the other main parties hold less than three seats each, and those parties 
are Jobbik, Democratic Coalition and Hungarian Socialist Party (see Appendix 6). The 
uniqueness for Hungary is that the main seat holder over the last two elections has been a party 
that holds moderately-Eurosceptic views. 
 
2013 Eurobarometer Results 
Now that I have identified first part of my DV, I will present the results for my IV. The first of my 
EB questions is Trust in the European Union (European Commission 2013). In the 2013 
Eurobarometer surveyvii of my four countries, with the lowest levels of trustviii were in France with 
only 28% of their population expressing support (see Appendix 7). Levels of support for the EP 
are slightly more positive but follow the same trend as the EU (see Appendix 8). France has the 
lowest levels of trust for the European Parliament at 38% and the highest in terms of not trusting 
that institution with 47%. 
 The Eurobarometer asks the respondents what their expectations are for the next year on 
the Union’s economic situation (European Commission 2013). The country that had the lowest 
positive view (see Appendix 9) was France with 17% feeling as though it would be better in the 
coming twelve months while also holding the highest negative view at 29% (the EB distinguishes 
votes between positive and negative views). ix 
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 Respondents are asked for their view of a need for a common foreign policy of the 28 
member states (European Commission 2013). For this question, the overall trend is that the 
respondents for all four countries are much more in favour of such a policy than against (see 
Appendix 10). The citizens of the Netherlands are the lowest of that group with 54% and also the 
highest against with 42%, the trend is similar when it comes to the question of a common defence 
and security policy for all EU member states (European Commission 2013). For this question (see 
Appendix 11) Hungary has the lowest levels of support. 
 
2014 Eurobarometer Results 
Trust in the European Union was lowest in France at 36% (see Appendix 12). In terms of the other 
three member states, there was an increase in support as well. Support for the EP was once again 
lowest in France (see Appendix 13). Overall support for the EP has also increased. Trust in this 
supranational institution remained the same in France at 38%, but distrust dropped to 44%. The 
greatest swing occurred in the Netherlands. The view of respondents on the economic situation for 
the next twelve monthsx (see Appendix 14) demonstrates that France remained stable, which was 
not the case for any of the other three member states. In relation to a common foreign policy for 
the 28 member states, France was remained stable while the Netherlands and Poland saw increased 
levels of support and Hungary more opposition (see Appendix 15). In terms of support for a 
common defence and security policy (see Appendix 16), there has been movement in three of the 
four member states; the only one left fairly unchanged is France. The trend between the two years 
is that; the people of France have the most stable opinions between the two EB surveys with 
increased satisfaction coming only in relation to support for the EU in general and the EP 
concretely. In the other three member states, the trends were not as stable and variation did occur. 
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Actions in the European Parliament 
The actions of political parties and what it means for the European Union continues during their 
time in office. The results thus far have brought about specific trends based on party placement 
and public opinion in each country. Now that that has been established the objective is to better 
understand what the parties do once in power. There are two issues areas on which I focus; the 
economy and foreign and security policy.xi In this chapter I begin by presenting the results for the 




The economy of the European Union has not been as stable as the member states would have hoped 
for. The Eurozone crisis from September 2009 caused high levels of uncertainty and put the 
economies of all countries involved at risk. Inaction on this issue was not an option because it 
would have led to a possible collapse of the system. It was therefore necessary to find a way to 
bounce back from this crisis and react in a way that would ensure that this type of event is prevented 
in the future. The argument is that if the Euro were to fail it could lead to the ultimate failure of 
the European Union as well (Bastian and Rossi 2011, 10-11).xii 
 I expect that the mainstream political parties would reflect in their voting higher support 
for the bills presented. In terms of the extreme and moderately Eurosceptic parties, I would expect 
variation but overall a lower level of support across the board. The results for the economic bills 
are broken down individually by country (see Appendices 17-20).xiii 
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 It is evident that all mainstream parties voted highly in favour of economic bills. While the 
percentages varied between 73% on the low end and 89% on the high end, the main trend is that 
across the board they voted very minimally against these types of bills. Evidenced from this is a 
desire to further cement, or in certain cases increase, the power that the European Union has over 
the economy by political parties. In France, Poland and the Netherlands, the pro-EU parties hold 
either the most or second most. Although in Hungary the situation is different, with the two pro-
EU parties holding the least amount of seats. However, they did still vote overwhelmingly in 
favour of the economic legislation put before the European Parliament. On the other end of the 
spectrum, the highly-Eurosceptic parties ranged in support for these bills at 7% on the low end to 
46% on the high end. The 46% is still support less than half of the time, which is vastly different 
from what we saw with the pro-EU. In this group of parties, Jobbik in Hungary was the party that 
voted most in favour of all of those in this group. In the middle of these two sets of parties are the 
moderately-Eurosceptic ones who range from 46% to 93% in support for this legislation. The Front 
National, as the outlier of the first part of my DV, was on the low end of support at 46%. The trend 
is that a newly elected moderately-Eurosceptic party is on the low end of support for economic 
bills, while the party that has been able to hold on to this power for multiple elections has 
established itself on the high end. I will now examine the voting results for bills on foreign and 
security policy. 
 
Foreign and Security Policy 
The European Union has been far from immune to the terrorist threats that have faced the globe in 
the 21st century. Since 2013 the threat to the EU has come in a multitude of forms and warrants 
serious consideration. Further to this issue is that the dangers are not coming from a singular 
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source, these groups are diverse (Europol 2014). This reality means that the European Parliament 
has had to consider what the Union could do to protect all member states from these threats. 
 Integration has traditionally not developed to the same extent for foreign and security 
policy as it has for economic matters. There was not even a discussion of a common foreign policy 
in any of the treaties, even into the early 2000s (McCormick 2008, 337-339). Both the founders 
and the subsequent developers of the EU had little intention to increase the bloc’s jurisdiction in 
this area. I expect that even those most strongly supporting the Union would be hesitant to give up 
some of their own power and transfer it to the supranational body. The results for the votes in this 
issue area are divided the same way as the economic ones (see Appendices 21-24). 
 There first trend that emerges is that all of the parties voted in favour less than they did on 
economic bills. The pro-EU parties were in support of these bills but the range was slightly lower 
with a high of only 82% and a low of 73%. The highest levels of support came from all four 
countries. The trend is similar on the low end as well and overall there is not much variation in 
terms of the results for the pro-EU parties. There is more variation among the highly-Eurosceptic 
parties with the lowest level of support coming from the Netherlands and the highest at 50% from 
France, with Hungary not far behind at 45%. The least support comes from the Front National in 
France while the highest is Fidesz from Hungary. The variation is once again present and in the 
case of the pro-EU and moderately Eurosceptic parties levels of support are generally lower for 
foreign and security policy relative to the economy. 
 
Theoretical Foundations 
In order to address both parts of my DV I will employ the theory of neofunctionalism. The 
alternative theory would have been historical institutionalism.xiv I begin by providing an overview 
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of the theory and then focus on the specific elements that are most relevant for my study. I use the 
rationale of actors aspect to answer the first part of my dependent variable and then the third section 
applies the spillover effects and how that explains the results of the second part of my DV. Finally, 
I address the theory’s future expectations. 
 
 
Overview of Neofunctionalism 
Haas took functional workings with the objectives of federalists. The main tenants of this theory 
are founded upon “technocratic decision making, incremental change and learning process” and it 
was Jean Monnet who added the importance of the spillover effect. As it relates to supranational 
institutions, and more specifically the EU, this theory would, at the outset, be able to shed light on 
how decisions are taken, what changes over time and how the actors within these institutions learn 
from the occurrences. While the theory itself has varying definitions due to its somewhat broad 
explanations it does have five basic assumptionsxv but there are two that specifically apply to my 
study and the results that I am explaining. The first is the rationale of actors which directly answers 
the first part of my dependent variable and the second is the spillover effect which lends itself 
perfectly to the ladder DV. 
 The rationale of actors portion of neofunctionalist theory emphasizes the ability on the part 
of elected officialsxvito be able to learn and change as they progress through various institutions 
and situations (Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 45-49). This addresses how parties get elected and 
why the changes can occur between various election cycles. Therefore neofunctionalism can help 
to explain why a group of parties in one country or generally across the board may gain power in 
one year when they failed to hold much after the previous election. Haas argues that actors learn 
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through processes of decision making and negotiating how to come up with policy that ensures 
their continued power and also benefits their region (Haas 1968, 291).With the recognition that 
the national government cannot solve all of the country’s issues and knowing that the European 
Union holds a key to power and solutions (Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 48) parties can shift their 
focus to the supranational level and aim to capture power there to make the changes they desire. 
Shifting their focus though has intrinsic in it the fact that the representatives come with a 
predetermined notion of the role of government, policy and the electorate (Haas 1968, 289). 
 The second element of the theory is the spillover effect. At its foundation it is the idea that 
there are some areas that rely on each other to such a degree that they are interconnected and 
therefore what happens in one will have an effect on the other (Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 49). 
This led to the argument made during the early days of the European Union which was that the 
integration on which the Union was founded led to a realization that other areas would come into 
the fold as well (Haas 1968, 292). While this spillover may be recognized by the actors and they 
are aware of what is occurring, the argument made by neofunctionalists is that this is something 
that occurs by virtue of the systems and the way they are built (Haas 1968, 383). As the EU gains 
increased powers, the national governments give in and relinquish some of their own (Schmitt 
1968, 229). The spillover aspect of neofunctionalism argues that the way in which institutions are 
built leads to an inevitable connection between areas which will lead to similar developments 
occurring. 
 
Analysis of the Results 
The neofunctionalist argument for the first part of my study is that the ability for parties to learn 
and grow in the way they think likely led them to be able to adjust and obtain the levels of success 
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that they did. This idea further posits that actors are self-interested and it’s most foundational level 
the objective of all politicians and political parties is to get elected and stay in power. However, a 
desire to get elected would not in and of itself lead to electoral success and a change of seats in the 
EP. The second relevant element of the rationale of actors is that they have the ability to learn and 
adjust their beliefs or policies (Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 48). This leads to the most likely 
conclusion that the highly and moderately-Eurosceptic parties in all four countries were able to 
identify the desire of their populations for someone to oppose the current EU establishment. 
 Once elected the political parties are faced with the challenge of voting for and deciding 
on legislation that comes before them on a daily basis. This was therefore the focus of the second 
part of my dependent variable, understanding what occurs once these representatives are elected. 
The voting across both issue areas divided greatly along the types of parties with the pro-EU ones 
being most in favour, highly-Eurosceptic ones least in favour and the moderately-Eurosceptic ones 
were right in the middle. The first trend that emerged was that the support levels across the board 
were lower for foreign and security policy than they were for the economy but what can be seen 
is that there is still some support for further EU power in the former. The fact that the voting trend 
though was the same in both areas is best explained by the concept of spillover. With the elected 
officials having established an understanding of the expansive role of the European Union in the 
area of the economy, as expected by neofunctionalists, this focus likely shifted to a different area 
and in this case it was foreign and security policy (Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 48). The lower 
support levels demonstrate that they are not fully at the same level yet, but the similar voting trends 
point to the most likely conclusion of spillover having occurred. Since this is a fairly new 
development, the continued advancement will take time. According to neofunctionalists, it is only 
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once the lobbying groups and other elites join in the fight, that this support gap will continue to 
close (Haas 1968, 292). 
 
Future Expectations 
The results for Hungary are a counterweight for those in France. The former has a moderately-
Eurosceptic party that has had long term success at both levels of governmentxvii and then the 
ladder has a newly elected party of that same mindset and their majority seat share at the EP level 
is their first widely achieved success. Comparing the two extremes helps to assess what the future 
may hold once a moderately-Eurosceptic party gets newly elected at the EP level. The results for 
voting in both issue areas demonstrated that the Front National from France was on the low end 
of support for the bills presented in the EP while Fidesz from Hungary was on the high end for the 
moderately-Eurosceptic parties. This demonstrates that, as argued by neofunctionalism, actors 
learn and grow and since their aim is to remain in power they learn what it takes to ensure they 
still stay true to their base but that they do not come off too extreme and get voted out. The 
expectation then is that if the Front National wishes to remain in power and guarantee their 
continued success then they cannot abandon their opposition to elements of EU power but they 
will need to adapt slightly and become slightly more supportive, if they do not then their void will 
likely be filled by another party of the same political mindset. 
 
Conclusion 
This study had two main questions: first, how do political parties get elected? Second, how they 
vote on bills once elected. For the first one, a link developed between lower support for the specific 
Eurobarometer questions and an increased electoral success for the moderately-Eurosceptic 
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parties, although success levels varied. The moderately-Eurosceptic Front National for France had 
the highest level of seat increase between the 2009 and 2014 EP elections. For Poland, there was 
a slight rise in the seat share for the moderately-Eurosceptic Law and Justice party. The seats were 
equally divided among the EP parties represented in the Netherlands, including the moderately-
Eurosceptic ones. Hungary saw little change between elections in the seat distribution, but only 
here did a moderately-Eurosceptic party have past success. Overall, France was the only country 
in which public backing was lower for all EB questions, both prior to and after the 2014 EP 
election. Citizen support varied in the other three member states, depending on the EB question. 
Therefore, to answer the first research question (DV, first part) and using the neofunctionalist 
theory, when the politicians of these parties see this low support across EB questions, they are able 
to rationally use this to gain power by highlighting their stance on these issues. Due to the less 
extreme positions of the moderately-Eurosceptic parties they are able to fill this void due with a 
wider reach. 
 On my second research question (DV, second part), it became clear that the parties vote 
according to their party’s support for the European Union. In calculating the voting patterns of 
each party in my four member states, the trend is that support levels were much higher on average 
for the pro-EU parties than for the highly-Eurosceptic and moderately-Eurosceptic ones. The 
former were on the lowest end of support and the ladder were in the middle. This was true for all 
four member states and for each party. There was variation between the two issues areas that I 
examined. Support for all parties was higher for economic bills than it was for those on foreign 
and security policy. Although the same trend existed for both issue areas, and it demonstrates that 
spillover has occurred. This spillover will continue to occur - according to neofunctionalists - until 
foreign and security policy becomes an EU portfolio and another area emerges and the same thing 
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occurs (e.g. taxation). The Front National had the lowest levels of support among the moderately-
Eurosceptic parties, while Fidesz had the highest. This is explained by the rationale of actors; they 
learn as they are in the position for a longer period of time, and their opinions might change. 
 The results of my independent variable made it more likely that public opinion in the four 
member states led to the electoral results observed. The success of the moderately-Eurosceptic 
party in France is matched by stability across EB questions with an increase only in the 
favourability of the economic outlook of the next 12 months. The lack of significant change in the 
other three countries was equaled by no observable trends in their EB results. This reaffirms the 
argument that it was public opinion that led to the election of these parties and not the other way 
around.  
 The implications of my study are two-fold: first, it is highly plausible that the results of the 
Eurobarometer determine the electoral success of political parties in the European Parliament (IV). 
Second, Eurosceptic parties are stable in three of my countries; only in France did an increase for 
a moderately-Eurosceptic party occur (DV, first part). In other words, Eurosceptic parties have 
little electoral success outside of France; therefore, the EB should be used prior to the next EP 
election.  
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Notes 
i
 Despite this, there were 29 pieces of the legislation on the economy, but a total of 101 on foreign and security policy. 
ii
 The standard Eurobarometer survey with the general public opinion questions is done twice per year and these were 
the last ones prior to and the first ones post 2014 EP election. 
iii Voting in the EP has foreign and security policy as one issue area while in the EB the questions are divided 
differently. There is one relation to foreign policy and one relating to security policy which is the reason for selecting 
these two. 
iv
 Of course, whether or not either one of these potential cleavage lines materialize is an empirical question, captured 
in the next two chapters. 
v
 This though is still early on since 2009 was their first ever EP election but Civic Platform did manage to capture that 
first victory.  
vi
 While this may seem like a veto power it is not in fact one. Even with their majority when it comes to the Hungarian 
delegation, Fidesz’s 12 seats are not enough to have any effect on their own in the EP as a whole.  
vii
 This was the last EB prior to the 2014 EP election. 
viii
 While my study’s focus is the European Union, I use this question to get an overall baseline of levels of support in 
each of my countries 
ix
 I left out those that felt it would be the same because my aim, as with previous questions, is to compare the positive 
versus negative opinions of the EU, EP and its future. 
x
 Asking about the respondents expectations for the next twelve months of the EU’s economic situation assesses an 
outlook that was not present in the other questions. 
xi I chose these two because the former is an area widely considered to already be under EU jurisdiction while the 
latter is one that is still understood to be mostly of national control. There are 28 economic bills that were voted on 
during this period while there were 101 that fell under the Foreign and Security Policy issue area. 
xii While this happened, whether or not this influenced public opinion is unclear. 
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xiii I only counted the parties with at least two EP seats and if even one MEP voted differently than the rest of the party 
than it is counted as a split vote. 
xiv Historical institutionalism does not fit as well as neofunctionalism because of the short timeline employed in my 
study. As well, neofunctionalism allows me to better understand the thinking of the political parties as well as the link 
between the two issue areas.  
xv 1) actors are rational and self-interested, 2) institutions develop on their own and in a may that may be unplanned, 
3) decisions are taken incrementally, 4) zero-sum games are not always the case, 5) spill over occurs between issue 
areas (Niemann and Schmitter 2016, 45-49). 
xvi For my study I will discuss this theory in relation to elected officials but the theory itself can apply more broadly 
to everyday individuals. 
xvii By long term success I simply mean that they have been relevant as part of the conversation for the past few election 
cycles. 
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Appendix 3 
France EP Election Results 
 2009 2014 
Front de Gauche 4 3 
Front National 3 23 
Europe Écologie 14 6 
Les Républicains 29 19 
Mouvement Démocrate 6 4 
Parti Socialiste 14 12 
 
Appendix 4 
Poland EP Election Results 
 2009 2014 
Congress of the New Right 0 2 
KORWiN 0 2 
Law and Justice 15 19 
Civic Platform 25 19 
Democratic Left Alliance - 
Labour Union 
7 4 
Polish People’s Party 3 4 
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Appendix 5 
The Netherlands EP Election Results 
 2009 2014 
Party for Freedom 4 4 
Socialist 2 2 
Christian Union - Reformed 
Political Party 
2 2 
People’s Party for Freedom & 
Democracy 
3 3 
Green Left 3 2 
Democrats 3 4 
Christian Democratic Appeal 5 5 
Labour Party 3 3 
 
Appendix 6 
Hungary EP Election Results 
 2009 2014 
Jobbik 3 3 
Fidesz 14 12 
Democratic Coalition 0 2 
Hungarian Socialist Party 4 2 
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Appendix 7 
Trust for the European Union 2013 
 Tend to Trust Tend not to 
Trust 
France 28% 63% 
Poland 45% 39% 
Netherlands 38% 55% 
Hungary 47% 46% 
 
Appendix 8 
Trust for the European Parliament 2013 
 Tend to Trust Tend not to 
Trust 
France 38% 47% 
Poland 51% 32% 
Netherlands 47% 46% 
Hungary 58% 36% 
 
  
  31 
Appendix 9 
Economic expectations for next 12 months 2013 
 Better Worse 
France 17% 29% 
Poland 22% 18% 
Netherlands 34% 22% 
Hungary 27% 21% 
 
Appendix 10 
Common foreign policy of the 28 member states 2013 
 For Against 
France 61% 30% 
Poland 71% 19% 
Netherlands 54% 42% 
Hungary 69% 24% 
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Appendix 11 
Common defence and security policy 2013 
 For Against 
France 77% 14% 
Poland 78% 16% 
Netherlands 74% 24% 
Hungary 71% 23% 
 
Appendix 12 
Trust for the European Union 2014 
 Tend to Trust Tend not to 
Trust 
France 36% 52% 
Poland 49% 29% 
Netherlands 46% 45% 
Hungary 48% 43% 
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Appendix 13 
Trust for the European Parliament 2014 
 Tend to Trust Tend not to 
Trust 
France 38% 44% 
Poland 52% 24% 
Netherlands 53% 39% 
Hungary 52% 36% 
 
Appendix 14 
Economic expectations for next 12 months 2014 
 Better Worse 
France 16% 24% 
Poland 18% 12% 
Netherlands 27% 24% 
Hungary 21% 20% 
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Appendix 15 
Common foreign policy of the 28 member states 2014 
 For Against 
France 62% 28% 
Poland 71% 11% 
Netherlands 61% 34% 
Hungary 64% 29% 
 
Appendix 16 
Common defence and security policy 2014 
 For Against 
France 78% 15% 
Poland 83% 8% 
Netherlands 80% 17% 
Hungary 69% 26% 
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Appendix 17 
 Economy (France) 




Front de Gauche 32% 39% 25% 4% 




43% 32% 21% 4% 
Europe Écologie 79% 21% 0% 0% 
Les Républicains 89% 7% 0% 4% 
Mouvement Démocrate 89% 11% 0% 0% 








Congress of the New 
Right 
14% 68% 18% 0% 
KORWiN 14% 75% 11% 0% 
Law and Justice 64% 14% 11% 11% 
Civic Platform 93% 7% 0% 0% 
Democratic Left Alliance 
- Labour Union 
89% 7% 4% 0% 
Polish People’s Party 93% 7% 0% 0% 
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Appendix 19 
Economy (Netherlands) 




Party for Freedom 7.1% 92.9% 0% 0% 
Socialist  28.6% 42.8% 28.6% 0% 
Christian Union - 
Reformed Political Party 
67.9% 25% 7.1% 0% 
People’s Party for 
Freedom & Democracy 
85.7% 14.3% 0% 0% 
Green Left 82.1% 17.9% 0% 0% 
Democrats 66 85.7% 14.3% 0% 0% 
Christian Democratic 
Appeal 
92.9% 7.1% 0% 0% 








Jobbik 46.4% 39.3% 14.3% 0% 
Fidesz 92.9% 7.1% 0% 0% 
Democratic Coalition 89.3% 10.7% 0% 0% 
Hungarian Socialist 
Party 
89.3% 7.1% 3.6% 0% 
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Appendix 21 
Foreign and Security Policy (France) 




Front de Gauche 50% 40% 6% 4% 




27% 51% 12% 10% 
Europe Écologie 76% 16% 5% 3% 
Les Républicains 75% 18% 1% 6% 
Mouvement Démocrate 80% 12% 7% 1% 
Parti Socialiste 82% 12% 5% 1% 
 
Appendix 22 
Foreign and Security Policy (Poland) 
Party Bills For Bills Against Bills No Vote Bills Split 
Vote 
Congress of the New Right 27% 40% 33% 0% 
KORWiN 26% 39% 34% 1% 
Law and Justice 63% 25% 5% 7% 
Civic Platform 74% 18% 2% 6% 
Democratic Left Alliance - 
Labour Union 
80% 12% 7% 1% 
Polish People’s Party 73% 18% 8% 1% 
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Appendix 23 
Foreign and Security Policy (Netherlands) 
Party Bills For Bills Against Bills No Vote Bills Split 
Vote 
Party for Freedom 14.9% 75.2% 6.9% 3% 
Socialist  38.6% 29.7% 31.7% 0% 
Christian Union - 
Reformed Political Party 
52.5% 31.7% 12.9% 2.9% 
People’s Party for 
Freedom & Democracy 
73.3% 13.9% 10.9% 1.9% 
Green Left 77.2% 15.8% 5.9% 1.1% 
Democrats 66 83.2% 15.8% 0% 1% 
Christian Democratic 
Appeal 
80.2% 16.8% 3% 0% 
Labour Party 82.2% 10.9% 5.0% 1.9% 
 
Appendix 24 
Foreign and Security Policy (Hungary) 
Party Bills For Bills Against Bills No Vote Bills Split 
Vote 
Jobbik 44.6% 30.6% 24.8% 0% 
Fidesz 75.2% 19.8% 5% 0% 
Democratic Coalition 76.2% 8.9% 12.9% 2% 
Hungarian Socialist Party 82.2% 8.9% 7.9% 1% 
 
